An Exchange Theory of Representation Within Interest Groups by Oots, Kent Lane
Journal of Political Science 
Volume 11 
Number 1 (Fall) Article 2 
November 1983 
An Exchange Theory of Representation Within Interest Groups 
Kent Lane Oots 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.coastal.edu/jops 
 Part of the Political Science Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Oots, Kent Lane (1983) "An Exchange Theory of Representation Within Interest Groups," Journal of 
Political Science: Vol. 11 : No. 1 , Article 2. 
Available at: https://digitalcommons.coastal.edu/jops/vol11/iss1/2 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Politics at CCU Digital Commons. It has been 
accepted for inclusion in Journal of Political Science by an authorized editor of CCU Digital Commons. For more 
information, please contact commons@coastal.edu. 
An Exchange Theory Of Representation 
Within Interest Groups 
I(eNT LAYNE OoTs 
Northern Illinois University 
A good deal of work has concentrated on constituency linkages in 
representative bodies and on the process of representation in those bodies. 
This work is well represented by, among others, Cnudde and Mccrone, 
Miller and Stokes, Hedlund and Friesema, and Fiorina, as well as such nor-
mative theorists as Pitkin. ' Little work has been done which concentrates on 
the internal representation process of interest groups. This paper will, 
hopefully, lead in that direction. 
Both interest groups and representation have commanded the interest 
of large numbers of political scientists. Policy making is often portrayed as 
a conflict among groups, latent or organized, and representation is seen as a 
defining characteristic of democratic government. There is a significant 
overlap among these two areas. This overlap takes the form of attempting 
to define which groups, if any, policy making bodies are responsive to. Such 
an approach seems to imply a belief that the policy positions of a given in-
terest group are representative of the membership's concerns. Groups are 
treated as monolithic structures behaving as a single, rational actor pursu-
ing a consistent set of policy goals. 
There is, of course, never complete concurrence between group leader-
ship and group membership. Truman explains that the internal life of an in-
terest group is a struggle to maintain a harmonious relationship between 
leaders and members. This drive for internal cohesion results, in part, from 
the fact that individuals have belief systems covering a wide range of areas. 
Only a small proportion of a member's beliefs can be expressed by any one 
group. A member of one group, therefore, is also likely to be a member of 
others. 2 
Truman thus sees groups as associations of diverse individuals. The 
task of the leadership itself is to unify its members to the best of its ability 
and thereby present an effective front for purposes of obtaining group 
goals. 3 
In so doing group leadership will revert to a variety of techniques to 
discern and control the policy positions of its members. Even the referen-
dum, a nominally democratic device, is used to influence the membership in 
the direction of concurring with the leadership. • . 
If Truman's view can be accepted, the process of representation within 
interest groups is the reverse of our normal conception of representation. 
Rather than mass control of elites, we have elites influencing the masses. 
Communication within the group takes the form of a two-step flow, 
wherein leaders attempt to make members supportive of given policies and 
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members then feed back the same views to leaders. Representation, as com. 
monly understood, plays a relatively minor role. Although, given the variety 
of member interests, we can assume that there are limits to what policy 
stands leaders can take. 
This contrasts with Olson: Even elite influence intended to prom ote 
harmony with regard to the purposive goals of an organization is irrelev ant 
in Olson's formulation. In Olson's formulation, groups exist in order to 
fulfill the common interests of group members. This is accomplished by the 
provision of public, collective goods. But, these goods, when provided, by 
their nature are nonexclusionary and thus available to all members of the 
group, whether they participate in the supply of the good or not. 5 
Members must be attracted to the organization by some means other 
than the provision of collective goods. By Olson's definition of rationalit y a 
rational actor can be induced to join an organization and thus mak e a 
material contribution only by means of selective incentives. Selective incen. 
tives are negative or positive goods available only to those who join the 
organization. 6 
These incentives may be economic or social in nature. 7 Their major im. 
portance, however, is that they are available only to members of the 
organization and not to the group at large. 
Large groups attempt to provide collective goods by means of lob by. 
ing. Their ability to do so rests on their ability to coerce the members of a la-
tent group into joining the organization and their ability to provide select ive 
incentives. These two factors are what cause members of the organizatio n to 
support its efforts to obtain collective goods. 8 Presumably, whether or not 
the members are truly concerned about the political goals of an organiz a. 
tion is not an issue. The organization exists because of its selective incen-
tives . The lobbying efforts of the organization exist as a "by-product" of it 
incentive structure. 9 
Intra-group representation does not become an issue in Olson's for• 
mulation. Moe takes a broader view of the subject than does Olson. Moe, 
like Olson, postulates that an individual will join an organization only if it is 
to his benefit to do so. Participation in an organization, however, may 
result from a variety of motivations. These may be purposive, solidary or 
economic. 10 Utility scales differ for each potential member so that any in• 
dividual's decision to join will be the result of his own valuation of the 
benefits made available to him as measured against the costs. 11 
An individual will make a rational decision to join an organizatio n i 
the utility of the collective goods plus the selective incentives offere d i 
greater than or equal to the utility of his dues. The organizer, or en• 
trepreneur, for the group must obtain a material surplus from his membe rs. 
That is, the dues he collects must be greater than the costs of supply in, 
selective incentives and collective goods to the members. 12 
The internal political structure of the group in Moe's formulatio n · 
much like that of Olson. Member goals and group goals bear no necessat1 
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elationship to one another. Members may be induced to join and remain in 
~he group by '.11eans of selective incentives, economi~ or social. ~eaders of 
the organization need only concern themselves with representmg those 
embers who place a high value on the political goals or collective goods of 
~e group. Even if such members exist they can be effective only as long as 
theY can affect the material surplus of the leadership. ' 3 
Moe's formulation resembles, in many ways, that of Salisbury. 
Salisbury sees interest groups as organizations for the exchange of benefits. 
Entrepreneurs develop a package of benefits which they attempt to sell to a 
market, the latent group. If the benefits are adequate and the return is large 
enough the organization will form. These benefits may be solidary, material 
or expressive~ 14 
Strictly expressive, political groups may form according to Salisbury. 
They are relatively inexpensive to organize and generally not long-lived. Ex-
pressive benefits have little intrinsic value and thus other benefits, economic 
or social, are often offered to members of an expressive group in order to 
stabilize its existence." 
In Moe's formulation it is possible for members to influence the leader-
ship subject to several constraints. Large members, those who value a good 
most highly and presumably will pay a higher price for it, have more power 
than other members. Contributions to the supply of a good vary with a 
member's desire for a good and his information about the behavior of other 
members. Members who join for selective incentives have no power over the 
leadership. Finally, subgroups may form which collectivize the resources of 
several members and thereby increase their leverage over the leadership. 16 
Moe puts Truman's pluralist perspective together with Olson's 
economic theory to explain the maintenance of interest groups. Truman's 
theory postulated that groups maintain themselves via political 
cohesiveness. Olson's view holds that selective incentives are the cause for 
stabilized membership. Moe believes that both political cohesiveness and 
economic incentives are necessary to maintain the group. Moe is quick to 
point out that this does not guarantee that leader s will represent the interests 
of members. Large members still have more power than small members and 
the group's package of selective incentives aids in the retention of members 
who are not concerned with political goals. 11 
Moe's view does allow for representation. It is, however, a market-
based theory of representation. Members must value some purposive 
benefit highly enough to be willing to pay its price. This price, in turn, must 
be high enough so that a leader will gain from the exchange of contributions 
for support on a particular issue. 
If this formulation is to be accepted then those among concerned 
members whose resources are the greatest, i.e., those who may most affect a 
leader's material position, should be more highly represented than those 
whose resources are smaller. We would expect the proximity between 
member views and leader views to increase as member resources increase. 
17 
The concept of representation based on exchange is not unique to 
Moe's analysis of interest groups. Fenno postulates that for Congressme n 
the act of representation is inseparable from reelection. Congressman are 
responsive to constituency preferences when they believe they will be held to 
answer at the polls. 18 
In Fenno's formulation another type exchange takes place. In this case 
constituents exchange their votes for Congressional representation. In ef. 
feet, the constituents affect the material surplus of their Congressma n. 
Fenno's concept, however, broadens the view of what constitutes an ex-
change relationship. 
In its simplest form representation takes place by means of a delega te 
process, i.e., an elite carrying out the will of his constituency. For this pro c-
ess to work two conditions must be met. First, an elite must feel that he has 
an obligation to do the will of his constituency. Second, the will of the con-
stituency must be clearly expressed. 19 
An exchange theory of representation requires that additional con di-
tions be met. An entrepreneurial political leader will change his own views 
when he can add to his material surplus by so doing. Furthermore, compe ti-
tion will arise when a potential leader believes that he can obtain a surp lus 
by challenging the existing leader. 20 
The exchange relationship between leaders and members presente d 
here will be somewhat broader than that presented by Frohlic h, 
Oppenheimer and Young. The testable propositions derived from this tre at-
ment will, however, be more narrow than those admitted by excha nge 
theory itself. 
Broadly stated, exchange theory holds that " ... interaction betwe en 
persons is an exchange of goods, material and non-material. " 21 This in-
teraction is basically a market process in which self-interested actors at-
tempt to increase their power over areas of interest to themselves, i.e., th ose 
areas of the greatest potential utility or disutility. 22 
Individuals are viewed as profit maximizers. An individual will do an 
act if, based on past experience, he believes the act will be rewarded. The 
more frequently the behavior is rewarded the more likely an actor is to emit 
that particular behavior up to a certain point. Each successive unit o f a 
commodity, material or non-material, has less utility than the previous unit. 
An actor will cease a given behavior when his demand for a particular co m-
modity has been satisfied. 23 
Furthermore, every activity has a cost associated with it. Presuma bly, 
to obtain a unit of one good an actor must forego some other good. The ac-
tivity itself also has a cost in terms of time and resources. Thus, an actor will 
emit a given behavior when he can profit from it. Profit is understood simply 
as the reward for minus the cost of a particular action. 2• 
An exchange can take place only if a given act is preceived by both ac-
tors to be to their benefit, i.e., they believe they can both profit from it. In 
groups this is even more problematic because it is more likely that some in• 
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dividuals will not find the ex~h_ange to ~e b~neficial. 25 Actors can, however, 
rade their influence over dec1s1ons of little interest to themselves for greater 
~nfluence over decisions of greater interest. 26 
1 
If a range of decisions, rather than a single decision, is to be made by a 
roup, exchange is possible. Each member will trade support on issues of 
~ttle importance for support on issues of more importance. This expedites 
the decision-making process and allows, as well, an expression of preference 
intensity. 2 ' 
From exchange theory it is possible to postulate several assumptions 
about the organization and maintenance of interest groups. First of all, 
groups must have something of value to offer prospective members. This is 
what Homans termed "cohesiveness." The greater the cohesiveness, i.e., 
value to members, of a group the more interaction there will be within the 
group. Simply, the more value members receive from the group the more 
they will give. 2s 
Moreover, the higher the level of cohesiveness in a group the more likely 
are the members to pressure others to conform to the practices of the group. 29 
ln this exchange process the higher the value of what a member gives the 
more he expects in return and the more he receives the more he is expected 
to give. Thus, the exchange system, by means of mutually beneficial interac-
tion, tends toward an equilibrium point. 30 
From the point of view of the leader, cohesiveness must be maintained 
by legitimating his authority. This is done by means of collective approval 
which is attained by the passing out of rewards. 31 The support of the group 
it obtained, then, by an exchange. Support is purchased through a market-
like system. 
It is apparent that maintaining a relatively cohesive group is a costly 
process. This cost, along with a broader distribution of limited benefits ob-
tained from a decision, could lead one to believe, as does Riker, that in a 
group situation only minimum winning coalitions will be formed. That is, a 
leader will seek to induce members to support him only until. he can be 
assured of maintaining his position. 32 But, as Riker points out, a lack of 
perfect information will cause a leader to attempt to form a surplus coali-
tion. Therefore, he is able to lose a few members and still maintain 
control. 33 This lack of information will tend to be exaggerated in larger 
groups, where face-to-face interaction among all members is impossible. 
The argument here is that despite what is presumed to be the declining utility 
of adding another member to a winning coalition, leaders of interest groups 
will seek the largest possible coalition. There are several reasons for this 
belief. 
First, the benefits obtained by the coalition which controls the group 
are often collective or purposive . Since these a.re not divisible the addition 
of other members to the coalition will not reduce the benefits to existing 
members. Second, imperfect information makes it unlikely that a leader can 
be certain of when, if ever, he has obtained a minimum winning coalition. 
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Third, the requirements of group cohesiveness and the need to presen t a 
united front when pressing the claims of the organization demand tha t a 
leader develop an internal support base that is as broad as possible . Four th. 
because a leader seeks to increase his surplus he must have contributi ons 
from as many members as possible, although he must "purchase" their sup. 
port. If, of course, the cost of adding a member by purchasing his suppo rt is 
higher than the new members' contribution he will not be added. Howev er, 
it is more likely that if the costs of adding members were uniformly higher 
than their contributions no coalition could be formed at all. 
A further consideration mitigates against minimum winning coalitio ns. 
That is, the surplus coalition membership offers some policy flexibility to 
the coalition leader. He can change his views and still maintain a c9re sup. 
port sufficient to maintain his own position even though some members of 
the coalition may defect. Furthermore, broad-based support is at the heart 
of the organization. Presumably, all members pay some cost for the 
privilege of joining an organization. If these members are systematically ex. 
eluded from the winning coalition they may defect from the organizati on 
and deprive the leader of their contributions, however small these may be. 
Only rarely will organizations benefit by losing members. 
This will prove to be important in an exchange theory of representati on 
in interest groups. Broad-based support is important because in an ex-
change system both leaders and members may attempt to obtain two types 
of surplus, material and non-material. Support from the membership has 
some utility to the leader and forms the core of his non-material surplus. A 
leader cannot ignore his membership, or any large portion of it, for very 
long. 
Both Moe and Olson postulate a structure wherein some or most 
members join a group for selective incentives. Others join for solid ary 
benefits and some join for purposive reasons. Still others join for a com-
bination of reasons. The implication of this is that a leader need only con-
cern himself with representing those members who are concerned with the 
purposive goals of an organization. Those who join for selective incentiv ies 
can be safely ignored as can those who join for sol idary benefits. 34 
The problem with this formulation is that it is static. It assumes that 
members join a group for a particular reason. A salience dimension is needed 
for this formulation to operate more realistically. A member may joi n for 
one reason, say selective incentives, and as time progresses he may beco me 
concerned about an issue or set of issues. He may, from time to time, tak e a 
political interest in the organization and at other times be unconcern ed. 
This is a function of the importance of a given issue for the member and not 
all issues are of the same import to a given member. 
Furthermore, a process of socialization takes place within the gro up. 
Members may be induced to conform to group norms. 35 Presumably, they 
can be induced to support the policy positions of the group as well. 
However, they may, once politicized, also demand a voice in policy deci· 
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sions and this is where representation becomes an issue for those who join a 
group for selective incentives. An extension of Homans' model3 6 tends to 
suggest that the degree of socialization may be, in part, a function of the 
other values which the group provides. A member could, then, trade 
political support for something else of value. Likewise, he could trade some 
other value for support on policy issues of interest to him. 
The static formulation of Moe and Olson tends also to ignore the fact 
that concern for policy goals may be related to dimensions outside of the 
organization. A member's time, resources, other commitments and cross-
pressures, for example, may influence the degree to which he actively sup-
ports or opposes a particular policy goal and the resources he will expend on 
that activity. Fluctuations in political activity levels of members, however, 
are difficult to treat empirically. 
Before turning to how we can operationalize some propositions of an 
exchange-based theory of representation in interest groups an examination 
of some of the problems posed by exchange theory is in order. The assump-
tion that interaction among persons is an exchange of material and non-
material goods is problematic. Material goods can be measured in terms of 
some numeraire. It is fairly easy for a researcher to measure how much of a 
material good has been exchanged and to derive thereby some measure of 
the good's utility to the traders. It is also, relatively speaking, easy for an 
actor to determine the value to himself of a specific amount of a material 
good. The difficulty lies with the exchange of non-material goods. Com-
modities such as affection, friendship and the like, have several properties 
which render them problematic. 
First, they are not easily definable in an operational sense. They are 
known to exist, e.g., a man usu~lly knows who his friends are; but, they are 
difficult to define. Moreover, they cannot easily be measured in terms of a 
numeraire. How many units of friendship there are and their value is dif-
ficult for a researcher to measure. Indeed, even the actors themselves may 
not be able to place a real value on friendship. Such goods may truly be 
"priceless ." Furthermore, it is doubtful that actors perform the kinds of 
calculations necessary for an exchange of non-material goods to take place 
in some measurable way. Such exchanges do take place but conscious value 
calculations by the participants are not part of the process. The difficulties 
in measuring conscious valuations of non-material goods are magnified 
when the process takes place at the subconscious level. 
Not only do these problems of measurement come into play in terms of 
value, they also render a theory of motivation for exchange difficult. The 
broadest definition of exchange simply allows for too many goods and too 
many motivations. The number of goods, ranging from currency to good 
will, which can be traded is too numerous for any systematic understanding 
to take place. Material goods can at least be measured as can a limited 
number of non-material goods. However, when non-material goods are ex-
changed the participants themselves may not have a clear idea of exactly 
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what it is that is being exchanged. How, for example, does one know that he 
has obtained good will through an exchange? One could develop a list of 
classes of goods, e.g., one class would contain affection, good will, frien d. 
ship and kindred commodities . The measurement problems would still re. 
main, however. Such a list would probably not be all inclusive and ex. 
changes of commodities not listed would no doubt take place. Furthermo re, 
errant cases are likely to occur which simply cannot be explained. It is 
plausible to assume that some people prefer bad will to good will. 
In sum, the broadest understanding of exchange theory is difficult to 
reduce into a testable set of propositions. This does not mean that excha nge 
theory has nothing to offer for the understanding of interest groups. On the 
contrary, it may advance us a long way toward understanding how gro ups 
form and maintain themselves. Specifically, it may offer us an understan d. 
ing of how representation occurs within interest groups. The major point is 
that we are limited to empirically testing only a limited number of propos i-
tions. To be verifiable an exchange must take place with commodities that 
are measurable. 
Exchange theory first attempts to explain how groups may come into 
being. Olson sees group formation as an attempt to sell selective incentiv es, 
generally economic benefits, to potential group members. If the value of the 
selective incentives is greater than the cost a potential member buys into the 
organization. The real goals of the group are purposive, but, the selective 
incentives are the key to gaining membership. The purposive goals have lit-
tle relevance for the membership and in Olson's formulation one can easily 
imagine people buying into a group whose policy positions they oppose or 
which are irrevelant to them. 
Olson 's formulation is unable to explain the existence of such organiz a-
tions as Americans for Democratic Action or the American Conservati ve 
Union. These groups offer little to members except for purposive goals and 
the prospect of collective goods. Members must, presumably, join the 
groups for purposive reasons. One could argue that for the members of 
these groups policy activism is itself a selective incentive; but, even the 
desire to be active requires some specific goal orientation. 
Moe presents a formulation which may explain more than Olson is able 
to explain. An entrepreneur offers a package of benefits, selective incen-
tives, solidary benefits and purposive goals to prospective members. If the 
sum of these benefits, in terms of personal utility, is greater than the cost of 
membership a potential member will join the group. For the entrepreneur to 
obtain a surplus the cost of supplying these benefits must be less than the 
sum of the contributions he receives. Thus, the entrepreneur receives a 
material surplus. Once formed the internal life of the group is a bargaini ng 
process in which the ability of a member to affect the leader's materi al 
surplus determines how much leverage he has over policy goals. 37 
If this exchange formulation does indeed carry over into the 
maintenance of interest groups it may help to explain how the process of 
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epresentation takes place. Representation will be at different levels for dif-
~erent members. These differences may be explainable in terms of exchange . 
for the time being the formative stage of a group can be disposed of. 
An ongoing interest group is assumed. Furthermore, it is assumed that 
members have joined the group for a variety of reasons. Some join for 
selective incentives, if the group does in fact offer these; others join for 
solidary reasons and still others join strictly for purposive reasons. Finally, 
a large number of members will have joined for a combination of reasons, 
e.g., a concern for policy goals and the desire to socialize with like-minded 
people. 
Once these individuals have become members of the organization a 
socialization process takes place. They may become more concerned about 
policy issues via interaction with other group members . Moreover, in-
dividual members exhibit differential concern for policy goals based on the 
nature of the issue and other factors previously discussed. 
Implicit in this formulation is the assumption that we are concerned 
with a voluntary organization . We assume that coercion does not play a 
role, at least in a formal manner as it does with unions, in affecting an in-
dividual's decision to join or his policy orientation. 
On the part of the leaders we assume that they do have a desire to 
represent the interests of members, i.e., they feel obligated to do the will of 
their constituents. This obligation may, in part, be a result of the desire of the 
leader to obtain a surplus from the members. 
We also assume a broader definition for the leader's surplus. A surplus 
may either be material or non-material. This allows for a better understand-
ing of the motivations of leaders. Members may have a variety of motiva-
tions for their behavior and so also may leaders. We will, however, attempt 
to define only a limited number of those motivations . From these assump-
tions it follows that, as Dobson, et. al., argue, the determination of policy 
goals for an organization is an exchange which takes into account the dif-
ferential bargaining strengths of members. 38 
We postulate that representation within an interest group will take 
place via an exchange of both material and non-material goods. For a 
member to be represented at all, however, requires that two conditions be 
met. First of all, a member must be concerned about a policy issue if he is to 
be represented . Indeed, it is hard to imagine an unconcerned member seek-
ing representation. Thus, the group which must be represented, i.e., the 
group to whom the group's leaders must be responsive, is limited to those 
who joined the group for purposive reasons or were politicized after joining 
the group. Members will seek representation only on issues which are of 
personal salience. Thus, we expect that the views of leaders will more closely 
resemble those of group members who are concerned about the goals of the 
group than those who are not. 
The second condition necessary to representation is participation. A 
concerned member, in order to be represented, must be at least minimally 
..,., 
active within the organization because it is through activity that com. 
munication between leaders and members takes place. A minimum condi-
tion of representation, in or outside of a group, is that consituents must 
communicate their preferences to leaders. One cannot take into accou nt 
member preferences if he does not know what those preferences are. 
Participation offers members a second advantage in that challenges to 
leadership will generally come from among the active members of the 
group. If leaders fail to respond to active members they may find their own 
position in jeopardy. It is possible, also, that an organized opposition may 
be a part of the group's active contigent. Such an opposition, however, 
seeks not to be represented but rather to overthrow the current leaders hip 
and should thus be distinguished from the active members who will 
challenge the leadership only if it is unresponsive. 
These two factors, concern and activity, can be understood in terms of 
exchange. Concerned members may increase or decrease their contributi ons 
or defect from the group if the leadership is unresponsive. In this way the 
material surplus of the leadership is affected. Activity, on the other hand, 
carries with it the implicit or explicit threat of a challenge to existing leader-
ship. In this way both the material and non-material surplusses of the leader 
may be affected. A leader who has been dislodged has no surplus of any 
type. 
Assuming that a group of members exists which is both concerned and 
active, we must develop a theory which can account for different ial 
representation among this sub-group. This is necessary because to assume 
that they are personally concerned and active is not to assume that they all 
have the same views. This differential representation can be accounted for 
in terms of exchange as well. We postulate that the leadership of the group 
will be more responsive to those concerned and active members who have 
the largest potential impact on its material and non-material surplusses. 
We refer to the non-material surplus as support. Leaders will be more 
responsive to members who are supportive of them than to those who are 
not. The reasons for this are two-fold. First, it makes little sense to be 
responsive to concerned, active members who are unsupportive of the 
leadership because they are, most likely, part of the active opposition and 
little can be gained from such an exchange. Although, a leader may from 
time to time seek to selectively "buy out" members of the opposition by 
bringing them into the leader's coalition. Secondly, we assume that a leader 
controls an existing winning coalition. His goal is to maintain that coaliti on. 
Those who are concerned and active members of the coalition may defec t if 
a leader is not responsive to them. Thus, a leader must be responsive to his 
own coalition members and may respond to those outside of the coalit ion 
only when he believes that such a move will not cause members of the ex-
isting coalition to defect. In simple terms, the leader will prefer to maint ain 
the largest coalition possible in order to keep his position secure. 
Finally, we turn to the material surplus of the leader. We assume that 
the leader wishes to develop as large a surplus as he can in order to achieve 
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the political goals of the group. Thus, we hypothesize, leaders will be most 
responsive to those members who have the largest economic resources 
which form the base for potential material contributions to the group. 
Ideally, a leader would prefer to know how much each member contributes 
or is willing to contribute and under what circumstances contributions will 
be increased or decreased. Such perfect information is unlikely. Therefore, 
it is reasonable to assume that leaders will use socioeconomic status as an 
easy screening device. A leader may not know precisely how much Member 
A has and how much Member B has but he may know that A has more than 
B. Thus, he will be more responsive to A on the assumption that A has, 
potentially, the largest impact on his material surplus. 
In sum, we hypothesize that for a member to be represented he must be 
concerned about a policy and active, at least minimally. If these two condi-
tions are met, the degree to which he commands a response from the leader-
ship will depend on his ability to effect the material and non-material 
surplusses of the leadership. Dobson, et. al., have tested some similar 
propositions with limited success. 39 The propositions themselves, however, 
appear to be sound. The next step is, of course, to attempt to fully test ex-
change theory as a framework for representation within interest groups. 
This paper has attempted to define a preliminary explanation for 
representation in interest groups . We have laid out several propositions in 
the hope of determining whom, among the membership of a group, leaders 
will be responsive to . In doing so we have accepted the basic premises of 
social exchange theory. At the same time we have attempted to reduce these 
premises to a limited number of definable and measurable concepts. The ef-
fort presented here offers a broader model of exchange than Olson's presen-
tation of an economic model. It is also narrower than the broadest formula-
tions of social exchange theory. 
One of the major virtues of the propositions presented here is that they 
are testable. They may be verified empirically. The next stage of the process 
is, of course, the testing of these propositions . 
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